Campaign to stop the TUC passing a full boycott resolution of Israel at their conference in September

Lorna Fitzsimons, CEO BICOM who was a recent speaker at a ZCC event has advised us that there will be a campaign to get the TUC to pass a full boycott resolution of Israel at their conference in September.

BICOM has prepared the following briefing note to ensure you are aware of the environment that this debate is going to take place in due to events in the region. We all need to take full note of the issues and key dates as our collective experience is they will impact significantly on the domestic debate.

BICOM FORECAST AUGUST 2010

Introduction

The communal organisations have talked about boycotts and divestments in the autumn but not the external events that will impinge on the debate. We have, over the years, realised that international events lead how audiences in Britain react, both positively and negatively. We have to do all we can to play to the strengths in the coming months. This means taking advantage of the possibility of being in direct talks and using what positives we have to minimise the potential crisis that most expect if nothing much comes of them. This document maps potential developments in the peace process and related issues to be aware of in the next few months. It seeks to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive, in order to provide what we think is important planning information given the situation and the challenges we face in Britain. We know the peace process is the defining issue for people in Britain when they think of Israel. We cannot be seen as responsible for another failure but currently, unless we work smarter, we will be. We are focusing on a project around the peace process in September that will hopefully educate expectations whilst still trying to get a bounce for Israel. The danger is that the media overplay the direct talks, as they have a tendency to go in to rhetorical overdrive. This could lead to false expectations and even more damagingdisappointment in the event of talks failing. Recently the Israeli Prime Minister has spoken more optimistically about a deal being done than at any other time in his premiership. However, he has been worried since the beginning of the year that all the Palestinians want to do is ensure Israel is blamed for a peace process that failed, as he judged they weren't interested in a real deal. We will see if Netanyahu’s expressed positivity can be realised.

Peace Process

Diplomatic momentum is building to get the Palestinians to agree to direct talks with Israel. The US is focussed on this and is backed by the Europeans and the Arab states.

Israeli Position

Israel wants to depict itself as the side that wants progress and the Palestinians as the blockers. Netanyahu wants direct talks to begin as soon as possible and at any rate before the end of the settlement freeze (25 September). He offered unspecified confidence building measures which are on offer to the Palestinians if they enter direct talks. The resumption of direct talks promises to relieve pressure on Israel and may make it easier for the Israeli government to resume some settlement construction whilst keeping international criticism as a manageable level. Netanyahu may hope the US will be so keen to keep the direct talks going that they will tolerate some limited settlement construction and will not support the Palestinians if they pull out of the process in protest.

Netanyahu may also be banking on US midterms (2 November) discouraging the US from sparking another crisis with Israel. However, the success of this strategy depends on the patience of the Obama administration. Whilst Netanyahu has made his goal direct talks, it is not clear what his plan is once he enters those talks. Netanyahu appears to want a stripped down process, with his trusted and discrete confidant, Yitzhak Molcho, as Israel’s chief negotiator. This contrasts with the plethora of negotiating committees under the Annapolis Process. He also appears to want Mitchell out of the room most of the time. This may clash with what the US and Palestinians will want, (although recent views from the US suggest that Mitchell is not believed to be a central as before). However, Bibi has given almost no clues as to his position on the core issue, including borders, which the US appears to have top of the agenda, as does the Arab League. Netanyahu has said he is ready to take risks and will defy his critics. During the recent Obama-Netanyahu meeting in Washington, Obama himself expressed his belief in Netanyahu’s genuine commitment to the peace process. However, there remains a perception in Israel that Netanyahu position is unlikely to be compromising enough to reach an agreement and that he does not expect to.

Palestinian Position

The Palestinian strategy is to avoid open ended talks that do not produce results. They have delayed talks by placing various pre-conditions, but sought to position Israel as the one to blame for lack of progress. Although the US strategy has tried to limit Abbas's room for manoeuvre, Abbas has so far avoided talks for several reasons. Firstly it has been an attempt to get Israel to make concessions ahead of talks, secondly he genuinely fears damage to his domestic credibility of engaging in talks that fail (as he expects them to do) and finally he has seen his position receive international support with Israel relatively isolated. The Palestinians have given various versions of their preconditions before direct talks. In Washington, Abbas demanded ‘progress’ on the issues of borders and security. Subsequently he has spoken about the need to extend the settlement freeze to East Jerusalem and for Israel to agree to base border negotiations on the 1967 borders. In their efforts to look serious about talks, the Palestinians have been unusually forthcoming about their negotiating position of late. Erekat talks openly about accepting a 1.9% land swap and thereare reports of Palestinian flexibility. Erekat says the Palestinians have presented Mitchell with clear position and a map. Abbas has been very clear about his position on security,saying he will allow a NATO force in the West Bank but not an Israeli force. The Palestinian position is currently hard to sustain because of the weight of international pressure to enter talks. The US are threatening to withdraw support from them if they do not enter direct talks. However, Abbas knows Netanyahu’s position will become more difficult once the ten month settlement freeze expires in September and that international pressure is likely to swing back onto Israel at that point.  

It is also noteworthy that Abbas went to the Arab League for authority to move, after decades of fighting for Palestinian autonomy. It is also an admission of the key role the Arabs play that the Europeans seem to have forgotten. It is thus even more noteworthy that even without an agreement on borders that the Arab league sought as a prerequisite todirect negotiation, they have sanctioned Abbas entering negotiations.

US Position

The US have, over the last few months, invested heavily in getting to direct talks. How long they will stick with them, and what their next move might be if they are not making progress, is unclear. The US has given strong commitments to the Palestinians on making progress but over recent months have put much more pressure on the Palestinians to enter direct talks. The US will be the arbiters of whether Netanyahu is engaging seriouslyin the process. There has been a debate in US policy circles about whether the US should change strategy and put their own peace proposal on the table. So far they have decided against this but it remains a fallback option for them. An alternative may be a demand both sides to articulate their positions privately to the US. The Palestinians claim to have done this, but Netanyahu has avoided doing so

What Hppens Now?

The Next Stage

The next stage being discussed is an official level meeting between Israelinegotiator Saeb Erekat, Israeli negotiator Yitzhak Molcho, and US Envoy George Mitchell in Washington. This would precede an Abbas-Netanyahu summit down the line. Should direct talks advance, this could be accompanied by Israeli gestures. These may include: lifting more roadblocks, minimizing the activities of the IDF in Palestinian cities, allowing the establishment of six police stations in Area B, and the transfer of an area of land in Area C for building a road to the new Arab town of Rawabi. The Palestinians seem interested in an interim stage of a meeting between negotiators prior to a leaders meeting, favouringanything that delays progress to direct talks another few weeks. Israel is keen to move quickly to a direct meeting between the leaders. In any direct negotiating stage, it is not clear what will be discussed. Israel may want to initially focus talks on negotiating its confidence building measures, and delay entering the final status issues.

Possible Developments In September And Beyond

Expiry of Settlement Freeze and Announcement of New Construction (Freeze expires on September 25.

This coincides with the gathering of world leaders for the annual UN General Assembly and falls close to the 10th anniversary of outbreak of 2nd Intifada.) On settlements, Netanyahu has to strike a balance between the right of his coalition and the US. There is no clear indication of how Netanyahu will deal with this and there is division with the inner cabinet of seven. One possible route is a return to the system under Olmert, where every new building start had to be signed off by the Prime Minister personally.

This would allow Netanyahu to say to his coalition ‘the freeze is over’. At the same time, he will carefully manage new housing starts at a level that will not create unbearable US anger andnot give the Palestinians an excuse to abandon the process. They are likely to be restricted to the major settlement blocs. Even if he manages this, which will be difficult give the hard-line taken by the Palestinians on settlements, any new construction is likely to come with considerable international criticism, including from European governments and the UK.

Talks Sart but Stall, Possibly Leading to a Palestinian Unilateral Move

If talks begin, Netanyahu is likely to want to want to move forward cautiously, to preserve the integrity of his coalition. The Palestinians, on the other hand, will want to move quickly, and this couldlead to the Palestinians losing patience and walking away from the process. Though theyhave not said they will make another unilateral declaration of independence (they already did this in 1988), the Palestinians and Arab leaders have made various other threats. These include seeking a UN Security Council resolution in support of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders options should talks fail. So far the UNSC permanent members have opposed such a step but some form of Palestinian attempted unilateral move could gain support,particularly in Europe, if Israel is seen to have not been serious in negotiations. Momentum towards this could increase as Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s two year plan of preparing Palestinian institutions for statehood (which was endorsed by the Quartet) matures in August 2011. (Though some observers of the Palestinian scene have recently cast doubt on the democratic credibility and institutional sustainability of the Fayyad programme). There is overwhelming international support for Palestinian statehood and very low credibility for the Netanyahu government. If the Palestinians walk away, Israelis likely to shoulder the blame, unless the US blames the Palestinians for not trying hardenough. The crux will be the position of the US. The success of any Palestinian unilateral measure, or attempt to secure an internationally mandated solution, may depend on whothey adjudge to be responsible for the failure of talks, and how much political capital Obama is ready to spend on the issue.

The Cost of Entering Talks Puts Pressure on the Coalition

Netanyahu publicly promised in his meeting with Obama to take ‘concrete steps' within weeks to persuade the Palestinians to enter talks. Given his stable position in the polls, and the lack of any obvious alternative government, Netanyahu may feel able to make some concessions. However, a change inpolicy over settlements, such as accepting a US endorsement of a distinction between settlements expected to be annexed to Israel and those expected to be evacuated in a final deal, would be hard to swallow for some of his coalition partners. Over the course of 2011 the shelf-life of the coalition starts growing shorter and parties will think increasingly about their electoral base. The likelihood of parties leaving the coalition increases. This goes for Labour as well as the right-wing parties. Some Labour MKs have threatened to leave the coalition if there is no diplomatic progress. But they cannot bring down the government. Without Labour the coalition still has 61 seats. As for Kadima, they are unlikely to join a coalition within a year of an election. If Netanyahu wants to reform the government with Kadima in order to pursue a diplomatic initiative (a huge if), this option will decline inviability towards the second half of 2011.

Obama Puts a Plan on the Table

There is speculation that the US administration sees direct talks as the next, but not necessarily final stage in the process. If talks are insubstantial, there is the possibility that President Obama will present his own formulation, or press both sides to make a ‘deposit’ i.e. tell him their real positions to prove their good faith. The window for a US proposal is after the midterms in November 2010 and before he gets backinto re-election mode in mid 2012.

Other Possible Developments

Palestinian Arena West Bank/PA

Cabinet reshuffle expected. Long standing dissatisfaction amongst Fatah leaders that they are excluded from Fayyad’s technocratic government.

Hamas/Gaza

The Grads that hit Ashkelon and Eilat in early August have been interpreted by some as a message from Hamas that they cannot be ignored in the resumption of negotiations. They may retain the option of escalating violence against Israel in order toprovoke a response and derail peace talks. However they are likely to fear the Israeli response is they escalate too far.

Flotilla

More threatened flotillas on the horizon, including from Lebanon.

Israel domestic/ political outlook

Lieberman case

As well as the coalition issues discussed, another source of instability is the investigations into Lieberman. Should he be forced from his post, it will constitute a crisis for Yisrael Beitenu and destabilise the coalition. The police have recommended indictment but no-one seems in any hurry to indict a sitting Foreign Minister, so the crisis could still be some way off. The threat of indictment may motivate Lieberman to stay in government.

Aryeh Deri entry into politics

Could impact Shas or lead to creation of a new party.

Labour

Ongoing pressure on Barak from within his party may push him to be more visible against settlements and for the peace process.

Kadima

Rumours of splits within Kadima have been quiet recently but the possibility of fractures within the party and challenges to Livni’s leadership remain, in particular from Shaul Mofaz. It is still to be decided if Tzahi Hanegbi will be adjudged to have committed crimes of moral turpitude. If he is not, it will rejuvenate him politically and could affect internal politics of Kadima. He appears loyal to Livni but is believed to be well inclined tojoining the government.

The Neighbourhood

Lebanon

The situation within Lebanon itself is uncertain because of recent developments in the tribunal to find the killers of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Senior Hezbollah leaders are expected to be charged and September is the earliest date for this. Hezbollah frequently uses its claim to be ‘resisting' Israel to win support and justify the existence of its independent armed forces. Hezbollah has also long threatened to retaliate for the killing ofthe movement's leading military figure, Imad Mughniyeh, in 2008, for which it holds Israel responsible. The backdrop of Hezbollah's growing arsenal is leading to a slow buildup of tension. Hezbollah may seek to avoid internal strife by heating up the border with Israel inorder to unite the country around it. There is a joint Syrian-Saudi effort to prevent the Hariri trial causing an outbreak of violence in Lebanon.

Syria

Syria is warming its relations with the Saudis and some perceive a recent cooling of relations with Hezbollah. There position remains ambiguous but this is an area to watch.

Iran

Current international investment is in sanctions, but there is low confidence of success. Iran is however feeling the pressure and may seek avenues to try and relieve that pressure, perhaps by re-engaging in talks with the West or by creating a diversion by promoting tensions elsewhere.

Egypt

Egypt remains a crucial player in the region with good relations with Israel and a Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The poor health of President Mubarak remains a source of concern. Mubarak is a reliable strategic ally of Israel and his demise will create uncertainty about the stability of Egypt and its future relations with Israel.

Britain-Israel relations

The new British government still bedding down. Matthew Gould will be on the ground as British ambassador in Tel Aviv in the next month or two. The first ever Jewish ambassador to Israel could impact the discourse in Anglo-Jewry about Israel. The universal jurisdiction issue is coming up for resolution, this could create impetus for more incoming Israeli visitors.